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SUBSTANTIVE MEDIA REGULATION IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A FAIR LOOK
AT THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
JUSTIN FISHER*
Those who won our independence believed that ... the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of
the American government.
- Justice Brandeis'
I. MEDIA OUTLETS AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
The words of the First Amendment are among the most
iconic in our nation's celebrated history. With a certain enthusi-
asm that was characteristic of the time, our founding fathers,
with one swipe of the pen, permanently enshrined the American
ideal of free speech at the forefront of the Bill of Rights.
Surely the framers of the Constitution did not believe such a
broad statement would resolve all freedom of speech issues from
that point forward. The founders could not have foreseen the
rapid technological advances that have occurred during the last
century.2 Consequently, attempts to reconcile the realities of
modern day broadcasting with the sweeping provisions of the
First Amendment continue to this day.
At the moment, the field of substantive media regulation
sparks numerous questions, but yields few answers. Should the
government be concerned with substantive media regulation?
Should the government regulate the media in any capacity? If so,
what is the government's role? Should the marketplace of ideas
remain free to self-govern, or does the government have a
* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2011, Notre Dame Law School; B.B.A., 2008,
University of Oklahoma.
1. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring). See absoJerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1648 (1967) [hereinafter Access to the Press].
2. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten
Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 273, 273-74 (2009) (describ-
ing how the United States judiciary has developed a complex free speech juris-
prudence over the past century, despite the fact that such a body of law was
largely unsettled at the turn of the twentieth century).
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responsibility, to any degree, to oversee the content of the media
landscape?
These are difficult questions, and as such do not lend them-
selves to straightforward solutions. Heavy regulation of the mar-
ketplace might stifle the free exchange of ideas; however, little to
no regulation might similarly result in the inability of minority
viewpoints to gain meaningful public exposure. As with most
matters where competing interests weigh against each other, the
optimal amount of government involvement likely rests between
the extremes of too much and too little regulation.
This Note explores the constitutional right to free speech in
light of the fairness doctrine-the longstanding policy of the
Federal Communications Commission regulating broadcast
media-by examining (1) the historical context from which the
fairness doctrine developed, (2) the reasons for its demise, and
(3) the major policy concerns of substantive media regulation,
both modern and historical. After considering what the doctrine
might look like if resurrected, the discussion contends that the
Commission should reenact the fairness doctrine as a policy
because it will (1) diversify the news media landscape, (2) impose
a meaningful standard of journalistic accountability on broad-
casters, and (3) prevent individual voices from dominating the
marketplace of ideas.
II. THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Early Years and the Limited Spectrum
The Federal Communications Commission, officially created
by the Communications Act of 1934,' has historically been
responsible for developing and implementing the communica-
tion policies of the United States.' The airwaves have tradition-
ally been viewed as a public resource that must be subjected to
rules and regulations to ensure efficient usage.5 The Federal
Communications Commission has been concerned with broad-
casting fairness since its inception.' The concern originally
stemmed from the limited spectrum' available in the early days
3. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)).
4. See DONALD J. JUNG, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE
BROADCAST INDUSTRY, AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 1981-1987, at 7 (1996).
5. Id.
6. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRsT AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH
ESTATE 194 (6th ed. 2003).
7. "The electromagnetic spectrum is a unique natural resource. . . . [Its]
value . . . lies primarily in its use for conveying a wide variety of information at
varying speeds over varying distances: in other words, for communication....
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of radio and the reality that every broadcaster could not possibly
have its own separate broadcasting station.' The solution to spec-
trum scarcity was the fairness doctrine.
"The [fairness] doctrine evolved through case law until it
became the subject of a major [Commission] report in 1949."' It
imposed upon broadcast licensees a two-part requirement to (1)
cover "vitally important controversial issues of interest in their
communities," and (2) provide "a reasonable opportunity for the
presentation of contrasting viewpoints on those controversial
issues of public importance."'o A later formulation of the
requirements provided more detail:
[T]he licensee, in applying the fairness doctrine, is called
up on to make reasonable judgments in good faith on the
facts of each situation-as to whether a controversial issue
of public importance is involved, as to what viewpoints
have been or should be presented, as to the format and
The radio spectrum resource itself has three dimensions: space, time, and fre-
quency. . . . The spectrum is subject to the phenomenon of interference....
That is, two signals of the.same frequency that occupy the same physical space
at the same time will interfere with each other (co-channel interference). Sig-
nals on adjacent channels may also interfere with each other. Interference usu-
ally obscures or destroys any information that either signal is carrying . . . ."
CARTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 42. To make the electromagnetic spectrum use-
ful for communication purposes, it must be organized accordingly. Id. at
42-44. The spectrum is first allocated (i.e., divided) into "blocks of frequen-
cies," which are then assigned to various services or users (i.e., certain frequen-
cies are allocated for television use, radio use, etc.). Id. at 44. The rights to
these blocks are then allotted to users in different geographical areas. Id.
Lastly, these blocks are assigned to various end users in their respective geo-
graphic areas. Id.
8. Id. at 194. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), the
Supreme Court noted that it was apparent in the early days of radio that "broad-
cast frequencies constituted a scarce resource whose use could be regulated and
rationalized only by the Government." Id. at 376. The Court went on to reason
that "[w]ithout government control, the medium would be of little use because
of the cacophony of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and pre-
dictably heard." Id. See also 67 CONG. REc. 5479 (1926) (statement of Congress-
man White) ("The ... radio conference .. . recognized that in the present state
of scientific development there must be a limitation upon the number of broad-
casting stations and it recommended that licenses should be issued only to
those stations whose operation would render a benefit to the public, are neces-
sary in the public interest, or would contribute to the development of the art.").
9. CARTER ET AL., supra note 6, at 194. For the report, see In re Editorial-
izing by Broad. Licensees, Report, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter Editorial-
izing by Broad. Licensees].
10. JUNG, supra note 4, at 1.
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spokesman to present the viewpoints, and all the other fac-
ets of such programming."
The doctrine thus allowed for some "discretion on the part of the
licensee" on how to best implement the requirements.12
Congress officially acknowledged the fairness doctrine in
1959'" while amending a provision that required broadcasters to
give equal airtime opportunities to political candidates," stating
that "[n]othing [here] shall be construed as relieving broadcast-
ers . .. from the obligation to operate in the public interest and
to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting
views on issues of public importance."15 With this language, Con-
gress reaffirmed and established the fairness doctrine by
statute. 16
B. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC:
The Supreme Court Weighs In
At its core, the fairness doctrine was created to protect indi-
viduals' First Amendment rights. The purpose of the First
Amendment is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee."' 7 In 1969, the Supreme Court of the
United States upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doc-
trine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC."
In Red Lion, broadcasters challenged the fairness doctrine
on "conventional First Amendment grounds, alleging that the
11. In re Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Con-
troversial Issues of Public Importance, 40 F.C.C. 598, 599 (1964) [hereinafter
1964 FCC Report] (citing Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, 13 F.C.C. at 1251).
12. Id. at 599.
13. Id. at 598.
14. SeeJUNG, supra note 4, at 9-10.
15. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274 § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006)).
16. SeeJUNG, supra note 4, at 10. This interpretation was the majority view
among federal courts until 1986, when the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that the fairness doctrine was not codified in the Communications
Act. Id. at 133-34; see also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 368, 380 (1969)
("This language makes it very plain that Congress, in 1959, announced that the
phrase 'public interest,' which had been in the Act since 1927, imposed a duty
on broadcasters to discuss both sides of controversial public issues. In other
words, the amendment vindicated the FCC's general view that the fairness doc-
trine inhered in the public interest standard.").
17. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
18. 395 U.S. 368 (1969).
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rules abridge [d] their freedom of speech and press."" The
broadcasters argued that "the First Amendment [protected]
their desire to use their allotted frequencies continuously to
broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they
choose from ever using that frequency."20
The Court conceded that broadcasting is indeed a medium
subject to the First Amendment,2' but stated that the "differ-
ences in the characteristics of new media [of that time] jus-
tif[ied] differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them."" The opinion then compared the use of broadcasting
equipment to the use of sound-amplifying equipment, reasoning
that, just as the Government can limit the use of the former to
prevent it from being so noisy that it drowns out private speech,
the Government may likewise limit the use of the latter to pre-
vent the loss of free speech."
Justice White, writing for the unanimous Court, reasoned
that "only a tiny fraction of those with resources and intelligence
can hope to communicate by radio at the same time if intelligible
communication is to be had, even if the entire radio spectrum is
utilized in the present state of commercially acceptable technol-
ogy."24 justice White went on to explain that, given the finite
range of broadcasting frequencies, it is untenable "to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish ....
[T]o deny a station license because 'the public interest' requires
it 'is not a denial of free speech.""' Regarding the First Amend-
ment issue, the Court reconciled the apparent tension between
the First Amendment and the reality of spectrum scarcity:
[T]he Government is permitted to put restraints on licen-
sees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on
this unique medium [,] [b]ut the people as a whole retain
their interest in free speech by radio and their collective
right to have the medium function consistently with the
19. Id. at 386. Specifically, the broadcasters challenged the doctrine's
manifestations in the personal attack and the political editorial rules. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. Id. at 386-87.
23. See id. at 387 ("The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a
sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff out the
free speech of others.").
24. Id. at 388. The Court also reiterated that it was this "chaos" that origi-
nally led to the enactment of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications
Act of 1934. Id. (citing Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 210-14
(1943)).
25. Id. at 388-89 (quoting Nat'1 Broad., 319 U.S. at 227).
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ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcast-
ers, which is paramount.26
The opinion then cast the fairness doctrine in a different
light, explaining that the absence of the fairness doctrine would
allow a small number of station owners and networks to "sell"
their limited number of available time slots to those groups or
individuals willing to pay the most money for them. 27 Here, the
Court touched on the heart of the issue-that the doctrine does
not necessarily deal with government regulation of speech, but
instead broadly addresses one of the conduits of speech.2 ' The
fairness doctrine is therefore largely in accord with the spirit of
the First Amendment. "There is no sanctuary," said the Court,
"in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship oper-
ating in a medium not open to all."2 ' Later in the opinion, Jus-
tice White summarized the holding:
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as
proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suita-
ble time and attention to matters of great public concern.
To condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a will-
ingness to present representative community views on con-
troversial issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of
those constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgement
of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.o
Over and above that, the opinion pointed out that the statute"
in question authorized the issuance of broadcasting "licenses if
the 'public convenience, interest, or necessity [would] be served
thereby.'" 32 At that time, the Commission used programming
proposals as a factor for determining to whom it should grant
26. Id. at 390 (citing FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358,
361-62 (1955); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); 2
Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947)).
27. See id. at 392. The Court also pointed out that such a scheme would
allow these broadcasters to only air opinions with which they agreed. Id.
28. See id. at 390-92. The Court, of course, does not deny that a certain
degree of friction exists between the First Amendment and the Commission's
need to regulate broadcast frequencies. Id.
29. Id. at 392. The Court also noted that "[freedom of the press from
governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests." Id. (quoting Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
30. Id. at 394.
31. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964).
32. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 394 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1964)).
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licenses." The Court then cited its own jurisprudence in
National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,3 4 where it held that "the
Commission was more than a traffic policeman concerned with
the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither
exceeded its powers under the statute nor transgressed the First
Amendment in interesting itself in general program format and
the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees."
The petitioners in Red Lion contended that the regulations
of the fairness doctrine were too vague and that their duties as
licensees were "impossible to discern."" Justice White readily
dispensed with this argument, however, noting that past deci-
sions of the Commission provided clarity to the regulations and
that, in any case, the applicability of past Commission decisions
to new cases was questionable and licensees would not suffer
sanctions in these situations without prior warning. 7
The petitioners' final attempt to challenge the fairness doc-
trine's validity was to assert that the problem of spectrum scarcity
no longer existed at that time." In response, the opinion stated
that "[s]carcity is not entirely a thing of the past" because,
although technology had increased the ability of the Commission
to use the spectrum efficiently, the number of uses for the spec-
trum had also grown.3" Having disposed of this last-ditch effort,
the Court went on to uphold the doctrine's constitutionality. 40
C. The Fairness Doctrine Post-Red Lion
In the years following the Red Lion holding, the Commission
continued to monitor the fairness doctrine's regulatory function.
In 1974, the Commission conducted an investigation and subse-
quently released a report4' detailing the operation of the fairness
33. Id.
34. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
35. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395 (citing Nat'l Broad., 319 U.S. at 190).
36. Id.
37. See id. at 395-96 (citing Personal Attacks; Political Editorials, 32 Fed.
Reg. 10303, 10304 n.6 (July 13, 1967)). The Court did, however, concede that
it need not and would not approve every aspect of the fairness doctrine, but
rather, that it would address specific applications of the doctrine when and if
they came before it. Id. at 396.
38. See id. at 396.
39. Id. at 396-97.
40. See id. at 400-01. The Red Lion holding has received some criticism,
but remains good law today, despite the fact that the Commission has not
enforced the fairness doctrine since 1987.
41. In re the Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974)
[hereinafter 1974 FCC Fairness Report].
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doctrine." This report reiterated the fairness doctrine's two
basic requirements: "(1) the broadcaster must devote a reasona-
ble percentage of time to coverage of public issues; and (2) his
coverage of these issues must be fair in the sense that it provides
an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of
view."" The 1974 Report, however, went on to explain that the
requirements of the fairness doctrine were not altogether
unreasonable:
When a licensee presents one side of a controversial
issue . . . [h]e is simply expected to make a provision for
the opposing views in his overall programming. Further,
there is no requirement that any precisely equal balance of
views be achieved, and all matters concerning the particu-
lar opposing views to be presented and the appropriate
spokesmen and format for their presentation are left to the
licensee's discretion subject only to a standard of reasona-
bleness and good faith.44
The 1974 report also alleviated some of the administrative con-
cerns of the fairness doctrine, explaining that the Commission
does not actively monitor the airwaves in search of violations, but
instead acts based on complaints it receives." Rather, the Com-
mission would only forward complaints to licensees if they
presented a prima facie case in support of a violation,4 6 thus
preventing the licensees themselves from sifting through inordi-
nate amounts of dubious claims.4 7 Moreover, the Commission
had already set out to reduce the number of cases by publishing
interpretative rulings "to advise broadcast licensees and members
of the public of the [licensees'] rights, obligations, and
responsibilities ... "48
According to the 1974 Report, "the public's need to be
informed [could] best be served through a system in which the
individual broadcasters exercise wide journalistic discretion, and
in which government's role is limited to a determination of
whether the licensee has acted reasonably and in good faith."49
The wording of the Report, therefore, suggests that the Commis-
sion and courts should apply the fairness doctrine leniently. The
Commission conceded that this remedial approach might permit
42. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 195.
43. 1974 FCC Fairness Report, supra note 41, at 7.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. (citing Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C. 2d 12 (1969)).
47. Id.
48. See 1964 FCC Report, supra note 11, at 598.
49. Id. at 9.
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some "questionable decisions by broadcast editors [to] go uncor-
rected," but concluded that "this approach represent[ed] the
most appropriate way to achieve 'robust, wide open debate' . . .
while avoiding 'the dangers of censorship and pervasive
supervision' . . . ."0
D. A Look at Red Lion in Light of the First Amendment
With so much focus geared toward its enforcement, the fair-
ness doctrine's purpose was often overlooked. How exactly did
the fairness doctrine's requirements enhance freedom of
speech? Legal scholars have debated this question at length.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ."" The opening words of the Bill of Rights5 2 invoke a
certain romanticism, as Professor Jerome Barron puts it, that res-
onates strongly with prevailing American ideals of freedom and
liberty." Scholars and judges have often understood the First
Amendment to protect a "marketplace of ideas" analogous to our
nation's free economic markets.54 In his 1967 article entitled
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, Professor Barron
cites Justice Douglas' dissent in Dennis v. United States to describe
the popular "marketplace of ideas" theory:
50. Id. (quoting Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1968));
Tobacco Inst. v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.
Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that speech cannot be regulated based on the
identity of the speaker); CARTER, supra note 6.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See Stone, supra note 2, at 274-76, for a discus-
sion of some of the basic interpretative problems raised by the First
Amendment.
52. The First Amendment's placement at the beginning of the Bill of
Rights was in fact by chance, as the first two of the original twelve amendments
were not ratified. However, the originally proposed second amendment was
eventually ratified in 1992 as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. AKHUL REED
AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BiocRAPHY 315 (2005); The Original Bill of
Rights-Text Version, EARLv AM., http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/
freedom/bill/text.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
53. See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1642-43; see also id. at
1641 ("Our constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of free
expression, a belief that the 'marketplace of ideas' is freely accessible. But if
ever there were a self-operating marketplace of ideas, it has long ceased to exist.
The mass media's development of an antipathy to ideas requires legal interven-
tion if novel and unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum-unorthodox
points of view which have no claim on broadcast time and newspaper space as a
matter of right are in poor position to compete with those aired as a matter of
grace.").
54. See id. at 1642 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584
(1951) (DouglasJ., dissenting)).
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When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and
free discussion exposes the false and they gain few adher-
ents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate
encourages the testing of our own prejudices and precon-
ceptions. Full and free discussion keeps a society from
becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and
strains that work to tear all civilizations apart. Full and free
discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith.5
Professor Barron points out that a necessary assumption of Jus-
tice Douglas' understanding of the First Amendment is that a
free marketplace of ideas can and does exist without government
intervention.5 ' Nevertheless, he notes that despite such a strong
inclination to keep the government out of the marketplace of
ideas, constitutional jurisprudence has been largely unconcerned
with the possibility of private interference, stating that "[t]his
indifference becomes critical when a comparatively few private
hands are in a position to determine not only the content of
information but its very availability ....
While a plain reading of the First Amendment's text would
seem to preclude any government policy purporting to restrict or
control speech,"5 the aim of the fairness doctrine was, in fact,
very much consistent with the spirit of the First Amendment. In
the years following Red Lion, the Commission affirmed this goal,
stating that "in view of the profound, unquestioned national
commitment embodied in the First Amendment, our goal in this
area must be to foster 'uninhibited, robust, wide-open' debate on
public issues."5 ' The Commission itself acknowledged this "strik-
ing paradox" in its 1974 Fairness Report:
At first appearance, this affirmative use of government
power ... would seem to raise a striking paradox, for free-
dom of speech has traditionally implied an absence of gov-
ernmental supervision . . . . However, the continuing
evolution of the media of mass communications ... has led
55. Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting)).
56. Id. at 1642-43 ("Justice Douglas's position expresses the faith that, if
government can be kept away from 'ideas,' the self-operating and self-cor-
recting force of 'full and free discussion' will go about its eternal task of keep-
ing us from 'embracing what is cheap and false' to the end that victory will go to
the doctrine which is 'true to our genius.'" (quoting Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494, 584-85 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
57. Id. at 1643.
58. See Stone, supra note 2, at 274-76.
59. 1974 FCC Fairness Report, supra note 41, at I (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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gradually to a different approach to the First Amend-
ment ... [,J one [that] recognizes the responsibility of gov-
ernment in maintaining and enhancing a system of
freedom of expression.6 0
Such attacks were not unprecedented. In the 1974 Report, the
Commission affirmed" its long held position on the matter, pre-
viously stated in its 1949 Report on Editorializing:
The freedom of speech ... does not extend [the] privilege
to government licensees . . . to exclude the expression of
opinions and ideas with which they are in disagree-
ment .... [The] requirement that broadcast licensees util-
ize their franchises in a manner in which the listening
public may be assured of hearing varying opinions . .. is
within both the spirit and letter of the [F]irst
[A]mendment. 2
The Commission went on to explain that, while the freedom of
the radio is protected under the First Amendment," "this does
not mean that the freedom of the people as a whole to enjoy the
maximum possible utilization of this medium of mass communi-
cation may be subordinated to the freedom of any single person
to exploit the medium for his own private interest."6 4 It also
added that the fairness doctrine was "a necessary and constitu-
tional abridgement in order to prevent chaotic interference from
destroying the great potential of this medium for public enlight-
enment and entertainment.""
To be sure, fairness alone is not enough. The doctrine
requires that broadcasters first be compelled to cover issues of
public importance. 6 With such issues, therefore, the fairness
doctrine does not excuse licensees from airing unpopular or con-
troversial sides of the debate simply by avoiding the issue
altogether.
60. Id. at 3 (citing T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970)).
61. Id. at 2.
62. Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, supra note 9, at 1256.
63. Id. at 1257 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131, 166 (1948)).
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 296
(1943)).
66. CARTER, supra note 6, at 195 (citing 1974 FCC Fairness Report, supra
note 41).
67. SeeJerome A Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the
Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487, 489-90 (1969) [hereinafter Access to the
Media] ("The argument has often been made that [the fairness doctrine] leads
to less rather than more discussion, for if the price of airing controversy is that
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Professor Barron has commented on a distinct but related
First Amendment paradox, stating that "l[t] here is an anomaly in
our constitutional law. While we protect expression once it has
come to the fore, our law is indifferent to creating opportunities
for expression."6 8 In response, Barron has developed his own
hypothesis, known as "access theory,"' which takes the notion of
substantive media regulation one step further. Access theory
asserts that the First Amendment, in addition to protecting the
press itself, ensures access to the press."o Viewed from within this
framework, the fairness doctrine deals less with the substantive
content of what members of the press can say, and more with
who is permitted to have a voice.7 1
III. A FAIR LOOK: WHY THE COMMISSION SHOULD
RESURRECT THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
As one of the most prolific writers in our nation's history,
Thomas Jefferson had much to say on the topic of the media,
and on June 14, 1807, offered the following assessment:
[As to] the manner in which a newspaper should be con-
ducted, so as to be most useful, I should answer, 'by
restraining it to true facts & sound principles only.' Yet I
fear such a paper would find few subscribers. It is a melan-
choly truth, that a suppression of the press could not more
compleatly [sic] deprive the nation of it's [sic] benefits,
than is done by it's [sic] abandoned prostitution to false-
one must provide still more time for controversy, the common-sense solution is
to present as little controversy as possible. Particularly is this the case when the
station may have broadcast the reply without payment for the time.").
68. Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1641.
69. See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimen-
sions, 76 GEO. WASHl. L. Ri-v. 845, 853-54 (2008) [hereinafter Substantive Media
Regulation] ("The regulatory concept of fairness was narrower, and less onerous
for regulated media, than Barron's ideal of access." (citing Barron, Access to the
Press, supra note 1, at 1648)).
70. Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1648. ("A realistic view of the
[F]irst [A]mendment requires recognition that a right of expression is some-
what thin if it can be exercised only at the sufferance of the managers of mass
communications."). See also id. at 1656 ("The constitutional admonition against
abridgement of speech and press is at present not applied to the very interests
which have real power to effect such abridgment. . . . What is required is an
interpretation of the [F]irst [A]mendment which focuses on the idea that
restraining the hand of government is quite useless in assuring free speech if a
restraint on access is effectively secured by private groups. A constitutional pro-
hibition against governmental restrictions on expression is effective only if the
Constitution ensures an adequate opportunity for discussion.").
71. See generally id. (arguing for an "access theory" approach to the First
Amendment).
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hood. Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a
newspaper. Truth itself becomes suspicious by being put
into that polluted vehicle.72
Jefferson's analysis revolves around the problematic existence of
a free press in a free market capitalist economy; when consumers
are, in large part, paying for the news they receive, the possibility
exists that they will simply pay for what they wish to hear, with
little regard for whether or not the "news" they are receiving is
fact or fiction. Jefferson's cynicism about the state of the media
still rings true today because it echoes the philosophical issues
with which we still struggle: the need for a press that is free from
government control, but the reality that, absent some effective
means of regulation, the press might devolve into disrepute.
A. The First Amendment at a Crossroads
So where does this leave us? The First Amendment ensures
the freedom of the press, but is freedom of the press truly free if
only a select few have access to it?
On Tuesday, August 4, 1987, the Commission declared it
would no longer enforce the fairness doctrine.75 This was a natu-
ral move at the time, as the original purpose of the doctrine had
long since become a moot point.
In the years that followed the fairness doctrine's repeal, the
media landscape continued to evolve. Among these changes was
the advent of opinion-based talk radio, which has prompted
72. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 11, 1807), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 73 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) [herein-
after WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON].
73. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 14, 1807), in
10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 357 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905)
("Perhaps an editor might begin a reformation in some such way as this. Divide
his paper into 4 chapters, heading the 1st, Truths. 2nd, Probabilities. 3d, Pos-
sibilities. 4th, Lies. The first chapter would be very short, as it would contain
little more than authentic papers, and information from such sources, as the
editor would be willing to risk his own reputation for their truth. The 2d would
contain what, from a mature consideration of all circumstances, his judgment
should conclude to be probably true. This, however, should rather contain too
little than too much. The 3d & 4th should be professedly for those readers who
would rather have lies for their money than the blank paper they would
occupy.").
74. Jefferson seemed to allude to this possibility in his letter toJohn Nor-
vell with his cynical speculation that a newspaper which "[restrained itself] to
true facts [and] sound principles only . . . would find few subscribers." Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 11, 1807), in WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 72, at 73. See also id. (referring to a newspaper as
a "polluted vehicle").
75. JUNG, supra note 4, at 1.
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some in Congress to discuss the possibility of bringing the fair-
ness doctrine back as part of the Commission's regulatory
scheme.7 " Partisan politics, however, have largely eclipsed mean-
ingful discourse on the matter. Professor Magarian described
the partisan dynamics of the debate during recent years:
Since the Democrats took over Congress [in 2007], calls to
revive the fairness doctrine have grown louder .... Demo-
crats and liberals, in advocating a fairness doctrine revival,
routinely target conservative talk radio's one-sided attacks
on Democrats and liberals. The transparency of their self-
interest has allowed Republicans and conservatives to con-
flate their own self-interest with libertarian free speech
pieties in warning that renewed regulation would lay waste
not merely to broadcasting but to the First Amendment.7 1
Despite the self-seeking political motives behind some of the fair-
ness doctrine's proponents, the Commission should indeed
reconsider it for inclusion in its regulatory policy going forward.
The need for a press that is both substantially free from govern-
ment manipulation and sufficiently restrained so as to preclude
free market abuse necessarily requires a compromise.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that the fairness doc-
trine itself is, in fact, a compromise of sorts.79 Compared to Pro-
fessor Barron's "access theory," which asserts that the First
Amendment should protect meaningful access to the press,so the
fairness doctrine is narrower and more attenuated. Professor
Magarian explains these differences:
Access connotes an obligation to admit not just divergent
ideas but particular divergent speakers who specifically
76. RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CAsES IN CONTEXT 1148
(2008). See also Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation, supra note 69, at 864;
Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the Abiding
Wisdom ofFirst Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. Rtv. 1373 (2006) [herein-
after Market Triumphalism] (refuting the principal intellectual critiques of courts
invoking the First Amendment to promote equal access to means of
expression).
77. See Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation, supra note 69, at 847-48.
78. Id. (citing Jim Puzzanghera, Democrats Speak Out for Fairness Doctrine,
L.A. TiMES,July 23, 2007, at Cl, C3; George F. Will, Fraudulent 'Fairness,'NEWS-
WEEK, May 7, 2007, at 72.).
79. See id. at 853.
80. See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1.
81. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation, supra note 69, at 853-54
("Given Barron's charge that First Amendment doctrine 'protects expression
once it has come to the fore' but ignores the importance of 'creating opportu-
nities for expression,' the fairness doctrine represented only a limited step in
the right direction." (citing Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1641)).
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demand a platform, and not just two opposing positions,
but the widest possible range of opinions that bear on
important public issues. In addition, the fairness doctrine
operated in a reactive manner, requiring some action or
willful inaction by broadcasters to trigger any liability; in
contrast, the access principle reflects a proactive and
instrumental effort to deepen and broaden public
debate.82
Thus, the aim of the fairness doctrine is relatively modest; it seeks
to apply a meaningful standard of accountability, but because of
its reactionary enforcement mechanism, it is predominantly
unobtrusive.
Likewise, some oppose the return of the fairness doctrine."
Even some of its proponents, such as Professor Barron, have
acknowledged its shortcomings." One criticism of Red Lion cen-
ters on its use of the scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum to
distinguish the fairness doctrine from other First Amendment
violations."
B. The "New" Fairness Doctrine
Both the news and media landscapes have changed drasti-
cally since the fairness doctrine was last used in 1987. With the
advent of the Internet, radio and television no longer dominate
as they did during most of the twentieth century. As Guylyn
82. Id. at 853-54 (citing JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR
WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF AccESS TO MASS MEDIA 150-51 (1973)); see also Barron,
Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1664; Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 67,
at 489-90.
83. See Kristen M. Formanek, Note, There's "No Such Thing as Too Much
Speech": How Advertising Deregulation and the Marketplace of Ideas Can Protect Ameri-
can Democracy in America, 94 IowA L. REv. 1743 (2009); Ellen P. Goodman, No
Time for Equal Time: A Comment on Professor Magarian's Substantive Media Regula-
tion in Three Dimensions, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 897 (2008); Josh Martin,
Comment, The Fairness Doctrine: The BCS of American Politics, 60 MERCER L. REV.
1393 (2008).
84. Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 490.
85. L. A. Powe, Jr., Red Lion and Pacifica: Are They Relics?, 36 PEPP. L.
REv. 445, 447 (2009). Professor Powe takes issue with the Court's use of scarcity
as a distinguishing factor, pointing out that "all resources are scarce, albeit
some more so than others." Professor Powe is also apparently frustrated by the
specific facts of the case, noting that Red Lion was an AM radio station in rural
Pennsylvania, which would seemingly make scarcity less of a problem in that
specific context. He seems to suggest that scarcity was merely a reason the
Court gave for applying a different set of rules because "[it] was sure broadcast-
ing was different." The Court posited in Red Lion that the fairness doctrine was,
in fact, consistent with the spirit and purpose of the First Amendment. See supra
Part II.B.
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Cummins notes, "the spectrum of scarcity on which the fairness
doctrine was premised does not exist for the Internet, cable tele-
vision, and collectively, the conventional mass media at large."8"
The fairness doctrine, however, was not merely a mechanism
for allocating the limited spectrum among licensees; it imposed
an affirmative duty on the licensees to "provide a reasonable
amount of time for the presentation over their facilities of pro-
grams devoted to the discussion and consideration of public
issues . . . ." Therefore, it was not sufficient to simply allow
everyone who would like to speak the opportunity to do so, nor
was it enough for a licensee to present both sides of any issue
that it broadcast. Presumably, there were certain issues" that
licensees were affirmatively obligated to cover, and they could
not evade their responsibilities under the second prong of the
fairness doctrine by refusing to honor their obligation under the
first.89
C. Dual Arenas
With spectrum scarcity no longer a dire concern, what rea-
son could there possibly be for resurrecting the fairness doctrine
nearly a quarter century after its repeal? Ironically, the lack of
spectrum scarcity perhaps offers the most compelling argument
in favor of the fairness doctrine's return.
As a Commission policy, the fairness doctrine only applied
to the media subject to Commission regulation: programming on
public airwaves. It did not, for instance, apply to programming
on cable television. A resurrection of the fairness doctrine would
86. Guylyn Cummins, The Fairness Doctrine Redux?, 26 COMM. LAw. 2, 4
(Mar. 2009). But see Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 368, 380 (1969). The
petitioners in Red Lion put forth a similar argument when that case was decided
in 1969. The Court responded that scarcity at that time was "not entirely a
thing of the past[,]" noting that, while advances in technology at that time
allowed for more efficient use of the frequency spectrum, the potential uses of
the spectrum had also grown significantly since the fairness doctrine was first
put into use. See generally supra Part II.B. An argument asserting spectrum scar-
city as a thing of the past would probably have a greater chance of success
today, but the electromagnetic spectrum is nonetheless a limited resource. See
CARTER, supra note 6, at 42-43.
87. Editorializing by Broad. Licensees, supra note 9, at 1249. The Report
went on to explain that "this duty includes the making of reasonable provision
for the discussion of controversial issues of public importance in the commu-
nity served, and to make sufficient time available for full disclosure thereof." Id.
(citing United Broadcasting Co., 10 F.C.C. 515 (1945)).
88. There is, however, presumably some room for disagreement as to
what some of these issues might have included.
89. Barron, Access to the Media, supra note 67.
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thus leave a large portion of the media and news landscape
undisturbed.o
This revived fairness doctrine would consequently create two
separate media arenas, one subject to the fairness doctrine, and
the other not. These separate spheres would result in two differ-
ent media markets driven by different principles. On one side,
there would be the media not subject to the fairness doctrine.
Here, opinion-based news personalities such as Glenn Beck and
Keith Olbermann would be free to run their programming as
they wish. On these channels, the "marketplace of ideas" would
be free to thrive, unscathed by government influence. The chan-
nels under the Commission's umbrella, however, would boast a
different purpose and mission. Commission-regulated channels
could commit themselves to covering important public issues and
giving fair coverage to each side of any debate." The result
would be a greater variety of news coverage.
D. Advantages of Dual Arenas
The dual arena system offers several advantages over the cur-
rent regulatory scheme. The first advantage is that it would help
to diversify the news media landscape. The current market con-
sists of one large, homogeneous sphere of news programming,
where participants compete amongst themselves for ratings and
corporate sponsorships. Generally speaking, corporations pay
the largest amounts of money to advertise during programs with
high ratings. Broadcasters, who need to turn a profit, thus have
an incentive to maximize their ratings by catering to consumer
demands, often leaving substantive content subservient to the
broadcaster's bottom line. Subjecting the public airwaves to the
requirements of the fairness doctrine will help push back on
moneyed interests by allowing the regulated class of broadcasters
to pursue fair and honest programming, insulated from the Dar-
winian impulses of the free market.
90. The resurrection of the fairness doctrine would at least not affect
these media channels directly. This shift could affect these channels indirectly,
however, as a result of changes in channels under the Commission's regulation.
Personality- and opinion-based talk shows, such as those hosted by conservative
commentators like Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck, might choose to move
their radio shows to private broadcasters not subject to regulation by the Com-
mission; one such alternative that was not available when the Commission effec-
tively repealed the fairness doctrine in 1987 is satellite radio. Acclaimed liberal
talk show host Alan Colmes, for example, has already taken advantage of this
new alternative. See Radio Bios, LIBERALAND, http://www.alan.com/radio-bios/
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
91. See CARTER, supra note 6, at 195 (citing 1974 FCC Fairness Report,
supra note 41).
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A second advantage of the dual arena system is that it would
provide a level of accountability that currently does not exist in
the news media. Meaningful accountability is essential to ensur-
ing journalistic integrity and public confidence in the news
media. As Jefferson's outlook illustrates," an absence of
accountability undermines journalists' credibility and eventually
reduces the news media to mere fictional status." The fairness
doctrine provides a way for the Commission to impose a moder-
ate level of restraint on its broadcasters without ruining their
journalistic freedom. Because private broadcasters would, of
course, not be subject to the fairness doctrine's requirements,
the cumulative effect would likely be insubstantial. Nonetheless,
reimplementation of the fairness doctrine would provide some
meaningful degree of accountability, even if only symbolic.
A third advantage of the dual arena system is that it would
help prevent a small number of large participants from dominat-
ing the news media marketplace. Given the prosperity the
United States has enjoyed under a capitalist regime, the tempta-
tion to decide controversial matters by relinquishing them to the
irrefutable wisdom of the free market is one to which our nation
often succumbs.94 With so much success, however, it is easy to
forget the vices of capitalism that appropriate legislation must
hold in check. One of the most obvious examples is the Sher-
man Antitrust Act," which prohibits mercantile trusts. The
"marketplace of ideas" is no different. While the government
can facilitate meaningful public discourse through a hands-off
approach, limited restrictions are necessary to prevent market
cannibalism and monopolistic consolidation. The fairness doc-
trine provides one such protective measure. With an affirmative
duty to (1) cover issues of public importance, and (2) present
both sides of issues," stations broadcasting on the public air-
waves would have limited commercial and editorial appeal. That
is to say, wealthy and influential broadcasters hoping to exploit
92. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Norvell (June 11, 1807), in
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 72, at 73.
93. Id. ("Nothing can now be believed which is seen in a newspaper.
Trust itself becomes suspicious by being put into that polluted vehicle.").
94. The broadcasting industry is, of course, very much a part of the
United States' free market economy.
95. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
96. Sherman AntiTrust Act (1890), OURDOCUMENTS, http://www.ourdocu
ments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=51 (last visited Feb. 14, 2011) ("[TJrusts
[had come] to dominate a number of major industries, destroying
competition.").
97. JUNG, supra note 4, at 1.
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competitors by means of acquisition or consolidation will have
less incentive to engage in such practices.
E. Potential Problems
As with any idea, the proposal to resurrect the fairness doc-
trine is not without its potential drawbacks. The result of intro-
ducing (or reintroducing) a rule to a new and unfamiliar
environment naturally carries with it some uncertainties. The
potential problems with the fairness doctrine are too numerous
and complex to detail in this Note, but I will briefly address a few
of them here.
One potential problem with dividing the media into two sep-
arate spheres is that it might encourage a "smoke screen" of
sorts. A benefit of resurrecting the fairness doctrine is its poten-
tial to restore the public's faith in the news media. The catch,
however, is that only broadcasters on the public airwaves would
benefit from this "restored trust." Increased confidence in the
public broadcasters could potentially encourage fraud in the
sense that some individuals (e.g., pundits, politicians, etc.) might
try to toe the fairness line in an attempt to gain access to the
public airwaves so they could take advantage of this increased
credibility." Deceitful efforts to gain a platform on the public
airwaves could admittedly lead to a myriad of problems if self-
seeking parties attempted to appear fair and meet the two prongs
of the fairness doctrine without actually having any intention to
honor its spirit."
Another potential problem of the dual arena system is that it
might encourage an unhealthy level of competition between the
two spheres. In other words, having two different sets of rules
might pit the two sides against one another. This problem could
manifest itself in multiple ways, but one scenario that might play
out is if two broadcasters, one in each sphere, began to compete
over programming. The legitimacy advantage discussed above
could allow public broadcasters to attract programming at a
lower cost, assuming, of course, that the subject of the program-
ming, whoever it might be, desired to have this perceptional
advantage. Though not inherently problematic, such a scenario
might result in lower quality programming if public networks
98. This type of behavior would essentially treat the fairness doctrine as a
government "seal of approval" of sorts.
99. This burden of government oversight is an inevitable weakness of the
fairness doctrine. As a practical matter, the Commission or another agency
would need to install policies to help ensure that the costs of enforcing the
fairness doctrine would not outweigh its benefits.
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were able to attract top talent without making competitive invest-
ments in their own resources."oo If a private broadcaster
attempted to compete in such a scenario, similar sacrifices in
quality by the non-regulated party might occur as resources are
reallocated toward attracting programming, resulting in a "race
to the bottom" in terms of overall quality.
Potential problems are naturally speculative and difficulties
are unavoidable. In the end, the most effective safeguard against
these drawbacks will likely be the size of the market; both private
and public broadcasters are more numerous than ever before,
and there is more than enough quality programming to go
around. These factors, together, will help protect the market
from an unhealthy level of competitive animosity between the
two spheres.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Federal Communications Commission should strongly
consider reintroducing the fairness doctrine as part of its regula-
tory scheme. Given the doctrine's limited reach and reactionary
enforcement procedures,"o' this is a modest proposal. With the
expansive media landscape available in the modern market, the
once unassailable predicament of spectrum scarcity no longer
imposes a significant barrier for those who wish to speak. Rein-
troduction of the fairness doctrine presents a workable occasion
for the Commission to (1) diversify the news media landscape,
(2) reestablish a meaningful level of accountability, and (3) pre-
vent market crowding, without disrupting the "marketplace of
ideas" as a whole.
100. A related topic is the networks' abilities to attract sponsors and
advertising. Paid advertisers might gravitate toward or away from one of the two
arenas, thus creating an inequality of resources. This could be particularly
problematic if advertising dollars began to influence programming (i.e., a
moral hazard might result if Commission broadcasters were encouraged to
push the limits of the fairness doctrine in an effort to please paid sponsors).
Sufficient financial resources would likely be necessary to insulate Commission
broadcasters from private influence.
101. See supra Part I.C.
